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I. INTRODUCTION

On March 14, 2004 the Tenth National People's Congress (NPC)
approved by an overwhelming majority a series of high-profile changes to
the Constitution of the People's Republic of China (PRC) intended to
enshrine the protection of lawful private property, the promotion of the
private sector, and respect for human rights as guaranteed under the
nation's fundamental law.' The amendments drew nationwide attention as
* J.D., Fordham University School of Law; M.A. (East Asian Languages and Cultures),
Columbia University Graduate School of Arts & Sciences; B.A., Columbia University. I would like
to express my gratitude to the staff of the Hong Kong Economic and Trade Office in New York for
giving me the opportunity to spend three fantastic months with the Legal Policy and International
Law Divisions of the Hong Kong Department of Justice. I am especially grateful to Sarah Wu and
Elia Wong for their efforts in organizing and financing my trip to Hong Kong, and to Professor
Whitmore Gray for his assistance and encouragement. I would also like to acknowledge the superb
work of the editors and staff of the FloridaJournalof InternationalLaw for their thoughtful and
instructive editorial suggestions. Special thanks to my parents and friends, whose love and support
are a constant source of inspiration.
1. The 2004 amendments were passed by a vote of 2863 in favor and 10 in opposition. See
Anil K. Joseph, China Legalises Private Property, Rediff.com, Mar. 14, 2004, available at
http://us.rediff.com/news/2004/mar/14china.htm (last visited June 1,2005). See also ChinaAmends
Constitution, CHINA LAW, Apr. 2004, at 53-54 (containing a table of the 2004 amendments). For
an excellent discussion by a mainland scholar of the policies behind the recent amendments, see
The Consulate General of the People's Republic of China in Los Angeles, Constitutional
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newspaper editorials around the country discerned a renewed focus on
"people-oriented" policies, and entrepreneurs, once considered the
enemies of communism, embraced their newfound status within the
hierarchy of the Communist Party of China (CPC).2 The volume alone is
indicative of China's growing commitment to the pursuit of
constitutionalism: the thirteen amendments nearly equal those made over
the three previous rounds in 1988, 1993, and 1999.' They also represent,
to some extent, the culmination of an ongoing trend to eradicate the system
of public ownership in China and to elevate human rights from a capitalist
notion meant to conceal proletarian exploitation to a legal concept afforded
the full protection of the law.4
Led by a growing number of foreign-investment enterprises and a
rising class of private entrepreneurs, the amendments are in large part a
response to China's economic modernization drive. According to the PRC
Constitution, the fundamental task of the state is to concentrate its effort
on "socialist modernization" pursuant to the theory of building "socialism
with Chinese characteristics" (zhongguo tese de shehuizhuyi).5 The 2004
pledge to safeguard the "legitimate rights and interests of the non-public
sectors of the economy" is based on the belief that such protection is a
prerequisite for the survival and development of the private sector, and for
the Chinese economy as a whole.6 From a more optimistic perspective, the
amendments may also be indicative of an emerging trend towards political
liberalization, as suggested by recent comments of Chinese President and

Amendment: A Look Through Expert Eyes, Mar. 22, 2004 [hereinafter A Look Through Expert
Eyes], availableat http://losangeles.china-consulate.org/eng/Topics/NPC/t80321 .htm.
2. See Li Wuzhou, People-OrientedConstitutionalAmendments,CHINA TODAY, May 2004,
availableat http://www.chinatoday.com.cn/English/e2004/e200405/p10.htm (last visited June 1,
2005); China Embraces Property Rights, CNN.com, Dec. 23, 2003, available at
http://www.cnn.com/2003/VORLD/asiacf/12/22/china.private.ap/(last visited June 1, 2005).
3. See A Look Through Expert Eyes, supranote 1. Among the more radical proposals for
constitutional amendments that were not approved by the NPC in 2004 include: abrogating the
dictatorship articles, establishing the transparency of public administration, removing the preamble
from the Constitution, establishing a Constitutional Commission or Court, and implementing
universal direct elections for members of the legislature. See Non-GovernmentalSector Submits
to the Central Authorities a Proposal on Constitution Amendment; Forty Scholars Call for
Abrogation ofDictatorship,H.K. MING PAO, June 30, 2003 [hereinafter Proposalon Constitution
Amendment].
4. See Li Wuzhou, supra note 2; Inclusion of Human Rights in Constitution Marks a
Milestone, XINHUA ONLINE, Mar. 14, 2004 [hereinafter Inclusion ofHuman Rights], availableat
http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2004-03/14/content_1 365532.htm (last visited June 1, 2005).
5. See XIAN FA [Constitution] pmbl. § 7 (1982) (amended 1999) (P.R.C.).
6. See id. art. 11(2) (1982) (amended 2004); see also Bian Yaowu, Legal Bases for
Development ofNonpublic Economy in China, CHINA LAw, Dec. 2003, at 54-55.
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CPC General Secretary, Hu Jintao, about the importance of embracing rule
of law and decentralizing government.7 In 1996 former CPC chief Jiang
Zemin adopted the official policy of ruling the country in accordance with
law (yifazhiguo), an idea which in 1999 was incorporated into Article 5
of the Constitution.' Although the principle that state organs must comply
with the law initially inspired little confidence in the CPC's willingness to
accept meaningful limitations on its power, the regime has subsequently
taken concrete steps to reinforce legal institutions and create a legal basis
for challenging the state. 9 The authority of the central government may end
up being further undermined by China's policy of fiscal decentralization,
which some contend has resulted in a sort of de facto federalism in which
local authorities are given more and more autonomy over the regulation of
the regional economy and the promotion of economic reform.1 °
But in an age in which the perceived indispensability of judicial
enforcement for rule of law has spawned a proliferation of constitutional
courts around the world, the Constitution continues to be regarded as more
of a political-philosophical declaration than a set of legally binding
norms." Without any democratic check on government or effective
enforcement machinery, the long list of rights it provides for is dismissed

7. See Hu Jintao, China 's Vice-PresidentHu Jintao Stresses Importance of Constitution,
XINHUA NEWS AGENCY, Dec. 4,2002; see also Arjun Subrahmanyan, Constitutionalismin China:
ChangingDynamics in Legal andPoliticalDebates, CHINA L. & PRAC., May 2004, at 27.
8. According to Article 5, the state "practices ruling the country in accordance with the law
and building a socialist country of law." XIAN FA art. 5 (1982) (amended 1999); see Randall
Peerenboom, Let One HundredFlowers Bloom, One HundredSchools Contend: DebatingRule of
Law in China, 23 MICH. J. INTL. 471,474 (2002).
9. See Peerenboom,supranote 8, at 520. Representative of these efforts is the changing role
of administrative law: initially intended to ensure that government officials serve the interest of the
state, it is now based on a "balance theory" designed to both protect individual rights and enhance
government efficiency. See generallyXIANDAIXINGZHENG FADE PINGHENG LILUN [THE BALANCE
THEORY OF MODERN ADMINISTRATIVE LAW] (1997).
10. The idea is that the post-Mao shift from a centrally-planned to a market economy will
inevitably lead to greater political diffusion - a sort of federalism with Chinese characteristics as local governments compete in diversifying regional economies and encouraging private
investment. See Sean M. Dougherty & Robert H. McGuckin, Federalism and the Impetus for
Reform in China,CHINA L. & PRAC., May 2002, at 30; see also Stanley Lubman, Bird in a Cage:
ChineseLaw Reform after Twenty Years, 20 Nw. J. INTL. & BUS. 383,402 (2000) (arguing that the
influence of local governments over economic resources and local business activity has "weakened
the 'Leninist structure' of the party-state").
11. See Albert H.Y. Chen, The Interpretation of the Basic Law - Common Law and
Mainland Perspectives, 30 H.K.L.J. 380, 409-10 (2000); see also MAURO CAPPELLETTI, THE
JUDICIAL PROCESS INCOMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE 186-87 (1989); DONALD P. KOMMERS & JOHN
E. FINN, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: ESSAYS, CASES, AND COMPARATIVE NOTES 43-44

(1998).
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as largely symbolic. 2 Human rights groups are quick to point out the
incongruity between China's ostensible obligations under the Constitution
and the status of human rights in China, noting that Chinese authorities'
cooperation with the international human rights regime has been limited
and highly selective. 13 The Chinese government has responded in kind by
characterizing Western pressure to adopt a Western-style legal system and
an European notion of human rights as a form of cultural imperialism. 4
Though China has grown more receptive to internationally recognized
notions of human rights, the PRC Constitution itself is founded on a
distinctly Chinese orientation that subordinates citizen's rights to the
interest of the state 5 and prioritizes the rights to subsistence and
development at the expense of all others.' 6
Immersed in the liberal democratic tradition, Western critics tend to
consider a non-justiciable constitution lacking the support of either an
independent judiciary or a constitutional commission to be a particularly
flagrant example of "paper liberty" undeserving of the honorific
designation of rule of law.' 7 By mandating the consistent and systematic
application of legal rules and delineating the constitutional functions of the
government, rule of law necessarily assumes the existence of mechanisms
through which citizens may seek legal redress against government

12. See Amnesty: China Human RightsAmendment "Must be Backed by ConcreteAction,"
EPOCH TIMES, Mar. 17, 2004 [hereinafter Concrete Action], available at http://english.
epochtimes.com/news/4-3-17/20438.html (last visited June 1,2005); Luis Ramirez, China Amends
Constitution to Protect PrivateProperty Rights, CLARINET, Mar. 15, 2004, availableat http://
quickstart.clari.net/voa/20040315.html (last visited June 1, 2005).
13. See Press Release, Amnesty International, China: Constitutional Amendment on Human
Rights Must be Backed by Concrete Action (Mar. 15, 2004) [hereinafter Amnesty International
Press Release] (on file with author).
14. See Lubman, supra note 10, at 410-11.
15. According to Article 51 of the PRC Constitution, "[t]he exercise by citizens of the
People's Republic of China of their freedoms and rights may not infringe upon the interests of the
state, of society and of the collective, or upon the lawful freedoms and rights of other citizens."
XIAN FA art. 51 (1982); see Michael C. Davis, ConstitutionalismandPoliticalCulture: The Debate
Over Human Rights andAsian Values, 11 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 109, 145 (1998); Human Rights to
be Protectedby Constitution,XINHUANET, Mar. 8, 2004, availableat http://english.pladaily.com.
cn/special/e2004lh/zyxw/25.htm (last visited June 1, 2005).
16. Despite the widespread advocacy for liberal democracy in China, studies indicate that
most people are actually more concerned about national prosperity and economic stability than civil
and political rights. See Peerenboom, supra note 8, at 473-74; Thomas A. Metzger, Collision
Course?,3 HOOVER DIG. (2004), availableat http://www.hooverdigest.org/043/metzger.html (last
visited June 1, 2005).
17. See, e.g., James A. Dora, 15 Years after the Massacre, Chinese Still Wait on Reform,
INVESTOR'S Bus. DAILY, June 4, 2004, at A16.
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encroachment. 8 Absent judicial enforcement of these rights, rule of law
is widely held to be meaningless. It would be unfair, however, to condemn
Chinese constitutionalism outright without considering the historical and
social conditions in which it has developed. 9 To some extent, rule of law
may be nothing more than a means ofjustifying the exercise of power with
an underlying belief system that is arguably no more legitimate than
China's communist ideology.2" Nor does rule of law necessarily guarantee
good government. As Randall Perenboom points out, if rule of law is not
necessarily rule of good law, an authoritarian legal system based on the
denial of human rights, religious persecution, and widespread poverty may
actually embody rule of law better than any of the legal systems of the
more enlightened Western democracies. 2'
The fact remains that without a relativistic approach towards rule of
law, constitutional development in China would be impossible, as it would
in any regime lacking electoral democracy and/or judicial review.22 In the
absence of these defining characteristics, however, China is indeed in the
process of working out its own hybrid form of constitutionalism, one in
which a certain degree of independence is maintained from political
pressures and in which law has begun to replace party policy and the "cult
of personality" as an independent source of legitimation.23

18. Michael Dowdle defines rule of law as a "condition under which the legal authority of
an act is determined more or less exclusively by its consistency with positively established legal
norms." See Michael William Dowdle, Of Parliaments,Pragmatism, and the Dynamics of
ConstitutionalDevelopment: The Curious Case of China, 35 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 1, 12
(2002). Randall Peerenboom's definition emphasizes the need for a credible normative commitment
to the principle that law is to bind the state and state actors. See Peerenboom, supra note 8, at 519.
19. See Zhenmin Wang, The Developing Rule of Law in China, 4 HARV. ASIA Q. (2000),
available at http://www.fas.harvard.edu/-asiactr/haq/200004/0004a007.htm (last visited June 1,
2005).
20. See Lubman, supra note 10, at 410 (attributing China's reluctance to embrace a liberal
democratic rule of law to the underlying fear of displacing communist ideology as the source of the
ruling party's legitimacy).
21. See Peerenboorn, supra note 8, at480-81. Peerenboom makes a distinction between two
conceptions of rule of law: a thin theory, which stresses the formal or instrumental features that any
legal system must possess to function as a system of laws; and a thick theory, which takes into
account elements of political morality such as economic arrangements (free market capitalism or
central planning), forms of government (democratic or socialist), or conceptions of human rights
(liberal, collectivist, or "Asian values,"). See id. at 472.
22. See generally Dowdle, supra note 18 (attempting to explain the phenomenon of
constitutional development in authoritarian regimes). See also ROBERT WEATHERLY, THE
DISCOURSE OF HuMAN RIGHTS IN CHINA: HISTORICAL AND IDEOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVES 120-21
(1999).
23. See Peerenboom, supra note 8, at 521.
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The following is an analysis of the theoretical considerations and
practical implications of constitutional revisionism as it has developed in
China since 1982. Part II discusses the function of the PRC Constitution
with respect to the changing role of the CPC as well as the ideological and
political incentives for constitutional reform. Part III examines the
trajectory of China's constitutional reform agenda by considering the
implications of the recent amendments for the promotion of socialist
modernization, the advancement of socialist democracy, and the protection
of human rights. The third and final part briefly addresses the practical
shortcomings and positive developments of constitutional implementation
and enforcement within the framework of an alternative conception ofrule
of law that is more consistent with China's own circumstances.
II. CONSTITUTIONAL REFORM AND THE SEARCH FOR
POLITICAL LEGITIMACY

Constitutionalism in China originated in the late Qing Dynasty with the
adoption of the 1908 Principles of the Constitution, and evolved with the
subsequent enactment of at least twelve constitutional documents. 24 Its
most recent manifestation emerged towards the end of World War II when
the PRC embraced Marxism and one-party rule. Introduced in 1954 and
modeled after the 1936 Constitution of the Soviet Union, the original draft
of the PRC Constitution contained China's first expression of modem-day
constitutionalism by guaranteeing equality before the law, mandating the
independence of the adjudicative and procuratorial branches of
government, and protecting private ownership of the means of
production.26 Within a few years, however, the 1954 Constitution fell into
disuse as Mao's radical economic plans and sweeping political agendas
left no room for legal restrictions on state power.27
When the second draft of the official PRC Constitution was finally
adopted in 1975, the social and political devastation wrought by the "Great

24. See Andrew Nathan, PoliticalRights in Chinese Constitution, in HUMAN RIGHTS IN
CONTEMPORARY CHINA 77 (1986).

25. See Davis, supra note 15, at 142.
26. In many ways synonymous with "rule of law," the term "constitutionalism" generally
refers to the subordination of government administration and lawmaking to the clear terms and
limitations on power imposed by the constitutional text. See Subrahmanyan, supranote 7.
27. See id.
For a fascinating and exhaustively researched account ofMao's fifty-year struggle
to dominate China and the twentieth century political landscape, see JUNG CHANG & JON
HALLIDAY, MAO: THE UNKNOWN STORY (2005).
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Leap Forward" and the Cultural Revolution was complete.28 Abolishing
most of the legal protections offered in the 1954 Constitution and
pronouncing the need to struggle against the capitalist elements of society,
the document remains a testament to what many still consider the
"inverted order" of China's political structure.29 Three years later,
however, the Eleventh Central Committee of the CPC concluded that
political centralization, as had been attempted in the Cultural Revolution,
would necessarily require a certain measure of democracy, and drafted the
1978 Constitution accordingly.3" Of course, the meaning of "democracy"
in China is strikingly different than in the West, and the resulting
"people's democratic dictatorship" (renmin minzhu zhuanzheng zhidu),
based on an alliance of the proletariat classes as led by the Communist
Party, continues to be derided as a backwards system in which so-called
"constitutional rights" refer to the authority of the state to deny individual
liberties rather than the authority of individuals to challenge the state.31 In
essence, if the 1978 Constitution was an attempt to counteract the anarchy
and bloodshed of the preceding decade by superimposing a form of
socialist democracy on the existing authoritarian model of government, the
1982 Constitution may be viewed as an expression of Deng Xiaoping's
determination to lay a lasting institutional foundation for China's
economic modernization.32 Progressive in many respects, the current
constitutional document de-emphasizes class struggle, omits all references

28. China's adoption of rule of law in its 1982 Constitution was motivated, at least in part,
by a desire to prevent such sociopolitical disasters as the Cultural Revolution. See Wang, supranote
19.
29. See Dorn, supranote 17, at A16 (attributing the CPC's unwillingness to respect property
rights to the "upside-down" relationship between the individual and the state as well as the
tendency of the Communist Party to deny others the rights it claims for itself).
30. See Wang, supra note 19. For a discussion of the Chinese "democratic" tradition, see
infra text accompanying notes 136-50.
31. See XIAN FA art. 1 (1982) ("The People's Republic of China is a socialist state under the
people's democratic dictatorship led by the working class and based on the alliance of workers and
peasants"). The people's democratic dictatorship is derived from the concept of a "proletariat
dictatorship," in which the proletariat, as a class, exercises powers as a dictator over those classes
that remain hostile to China's political system (the opponents of the "people"). See Shingo
Morikawa, Citizen's Rights and Democracy Under the Constitution of the PRC, CHINA
CONNECTION: LEGAL F., availableat http://www.enstar.co.uk/china/law/articles/legale.htm (last
visited July 31, 2004).
32. By balancing centralized economic planning with supplementary market competition, the
1982 PRC Constitution provided a solid legal foundation for the progressively liberal policies of
the CPC's economic agenda. See XIAN FA art. 11 (1982) ("[tlhe individual economy of urban and
rural working people, operated within the limits prescribed by law, is a complement to the socialist
public economy").
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to the Cultural Revolution, clarifies citizens' "fundamental rights and
duties,"3 3 and stresses the importance of socialist law for the regulation of
political behavior.34
Among the most common criticisms of constitutionalism in China is
that, despite the nation's professed commitment to rule of law, the status
of the 1982 Constitution remains subordinate to that of the CPC. Article
5 expressly states that all Chinese organizations "must abide by the
Constitution," while the party's deference to it goes unquestioned among
Chinese legal scholars and officials.35 In rare cases, proposed measures by
the CPC have even been struck down as unconstitutional.36 Critics argue,
however, that the distinction between the CPC and the PRC Constitution
itself is meaningless.37 Although the state professes to accept certain
constitutional limits on its authority, the CPC maintains tight control of the
political system through its appointment of key legislative officials as well
as the exclusive authority of the NPC and its Standing Committee
(NPCSC) to determine and interpret the constitutionality of any given
law.3" Also, because the Constitution specifies neither the scope of
legislative authority nor of citizen's rights, the meaning of a given
provision necessarily depends on the party-elected legislature's
interpretation of the relevant legislation.39 In a "democratic" system in
which the CPC acts as the vanguard of the people but the "people"
necessarily excludes anyone opposed to the government, the PRC
Constitution remains essentially a disingenuous means of legitimizing

33. See id. arts. 33-35, 41 (1982); see also infra text accompanying notes 180-209.
34. See, e.g., XIAN FA art. 5(3) (1982) ("[a]ll state organs, the armed forces, all political
parties and public organizations and all enterprises and undertakings must abide by the Constitution
and the law").
35. See id.; see also Hu Jintao, supranote 7 (stating that "the party organizations at all levels
and the whole body of party members must abide by the constitution in model fashion").
36. In 1993, for example, the NPC refused to allow the party to directly submit constitutional
amendments for consideration on the grounds that it was not a state organization recognized by law.
See Constitution of the People's Republic of China, Free Dictionary.com, available at
encyclopedia.thefreedictionary.com (last visited June 1, 2005).
37. Under Article 67 of the PRC Constitution and article 42 of the "PRC Legislative
Procedure Law" (Law-Making Law), the power ofinterpreting the PRC Constitution, and therefore
determining the scope of citizen's rights, belongs exclusively to the NPC and/or its Standing
Committee. See XIAN FA art. 67(1, 7, 8) (1982); Law-Making Law art. 42 (2000); see also
Morikawa, supranote 31.
38. See supra text accompanying note 37.
39. Article 33 of the PRC Constitution simply provides that "[e]very citizen is entitled to the
ights and.., duties prescribed by the Constitution and the law," but does not specify exactly what
these "rights and duties" entail. See XIAN FA art. 33(3) (1982); see also Morikawa, supra note 31.
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party policy.40 According to Randall Peerenboom, this is entirely
consistent with socialist legal theory, which conceives of law as a tool of
the ruling class.4 '
This underlying tension between the function of law and policy in the
legitimation of power is manifest in everything from Chinese leaders'
ambivalence towards rule of law to the vague and indeterminate language
of Chinese legislation and of the Constitution itself. Under Mao, CPC
policy alone governed the Chinese Party-State. 42 Although the 1982
Constitution called for legislation to take a more active role as the
appropriate vehicle for defining and implementing policy, party leaders
remain reluctant to relinquish control. When President Jiang Zemin
proclaimed in 1996 that the China should be ruled by law, he immediately
qualified it with a short-hand reference to maintaining the power of the
CPC. 43 Referring to the PRC Constitution as the "expression of the
people's will," Hu Jintao nonetheless proclaimed that its implementation
necessarily requires strict adherence to party leadership." In point of fact,
China has made some progress in specifically enumerating legislative
powers.45 Yet the continued use of broad administrative discretion in
interpreting law, as facilitated by the vague language of Chinese
legislation, reinforces the underlying tendency to apply laws like the
policies they were meant to replace.46 Under the Western tradition, laws
which fail to set precise limits on legal and illegal behavior or to define the
consequences of noncompliance are deemed unconstitutional for several

40. Although the scope of the "people" has gradually expanded as the exploiting classes have
supposedly vanished over time, it still implicitly excludes any opponent of the government who is
hostile to China's political system. See, e.g., XIAN FA pmbl. § 8 (1982) ("the Chinese people must
fight against those forces and elements, both at home and abroad, that are hostile to China's
socialist system and try to undermine it"); see also Morikawa, supranote 31.
41. See Peerenboom, supra note 8, at 506.
42. See Lubman, supra note 10, at 384; Peerenboom, supra note 8, at 506.
43. See Lubman, supra note 10, at 399. Jiang endorsed rule of law in order to "protect the
long-term peace and stability of the country." Id.
44. According to Hu, the most fundamental task of developing socialist democratic politics
is to "organically combine adhering to party leadership, having the people as the masters of the
house, and ruling the country according to law." Hu Jintao, supra note 7.
45. In an effort to compensate for the inadequate allocation of legislative powers by the PRC
Constitution, the Law-Making Law specifically lists the exclusive legislative powers of the central
government for the first time in PRC legislative history. See Li Yahong, The Law-Making Law: A
Solution to the Problems in the Chinese Legislative System?, 30 H.K.L.J. 120, 125-26 (2000).
46. The problem is exacerbated by the application of so-called "policy laws," consisting of
administrative regulations, meetings, instructions, and speeches that become legally binding simply
because they emanate from authoritative government or party bodies. See Lubman, supra note 10,
at 391-92.
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reasons, one of which is to prevent legal fragmentation and internal
inconsistency.47 In China, however, the failure to expressly define the
substantive and procedural contents of a given law also has a distinct
advantage: by ensuring greater interpretive flexibility, it guarantees the
continued domination of the ruling party in spite of its apparent
subordination to the Constitution."
The manipulation of ideology has also played an important role in
legitimizing the authority of the Chinese Communist regime, and the PRC
Constitution is no exception.49 In liberal democracies the normative agenda
for society is determined by the people through elections; in China the
CPC itself establishes the social agenda in its role as vanguard of the
people." Currently, this agenda consists of four cardinal principles: the
leadership of the Communist Party, adherence to the socialist cause, the
dictatorship of the proletariat, and devotion to Marxism-Leninism-Mao
Zedong thought.5' No constitutional amendment may violate any of these
principles, which does not mean, however, that the principles themselves
may not be altered or supplemented.52 The March 2004 amendments, for
example, incorporated the "three civilizations" into the preamble, a
reference for the need to develop a "socialist spiritual civilization" so as
to keep up with the improved material conditions brought on by
industrialization.53 According to some critics, it was also meant to preempt
47. Chinese legal scholars have used a similar argument to criticize China's "policy laws."
See, e.g., Yuanyuan Shen, ConceptionsandReceptionsofLegality: Understandingthe Complexity
of Law Reform in Modern China, in THE LIMITs OF THE RuLE OF LAW 21-29 (2000).
48. As evident in the use of criminal sanctions against any social movements that appear to
threaten CCP rule, the CCP continues to use law as an instrument to maintain and carry out party
policies. See Lubman, supra note 10, at 399.
49. Based on the notion that constitutionalism in China is inextricable from communist
ideology, some have argued that the incorporation of ideology into Chinese legislation affords
certain laws a special heightened status. See Li Yahong, supra note 45, at 122 (arguing that the
insertion of the four cardinal principles into the final draft of the Law-Making Law is an indication
of its status as "an important basic law that has a very close relationship with the Constitution").
50. See Peerenboom, supra note 8, at 492-93.
51. See XIAN FA pmbl. § 7 (1982); see also 16th Party Congress Spirit to be Written into
Constitution, PEOPLE's DAiLY, Oct. 15, 2003, available at http://englishl.peopledaily.com.cn/
200310/15/eng20031015_126025.shtml (last visited June 1, 2005).
52. See Qiao Shi Speaks at Constitution Anniversary Rally, BBC Summary of World
Broadcasts, Dec. 7, 1992 [hereinafter Qiao Shi Speech] ("To implement and enforce the
Constitution, we must unswervingly uphold the party's basic line.... In unswervingly upholding
the party's basic line, we must steadfastly adhere to the four cardinal principles").
53. See XIAN FA pmbl. § 7 (1982) (amended 2004) ("[T]he Chinese people ... [will] work
hard and self-reliantly to realize the modernization of industry, agriculture, national defense and
science and technology step by step, in order to promote coordinated development of the material,
political and spiritual civilizations"); see also Hu Jintao, supranote 7 (arguing that the development

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/fjil/vol17/iss2/3

10

Blanchard: Constitutional Revisionism in the PRC: "Seeking Truth from Facts"

CONSTTUTIONAL REVISIONISM IN THE PRC: "SEEKING TRUTH FROMFACTS"

the formation of an autonomous popular culture considered by many in the
party to be vulgar, superstitious, unhealthy, and even pornographic. 4 At
the same time that the NPC amended Article 5 in March 1999 to proclaim
rule of law in China, it also revised the preamble to incorporate "Deng
Xiaoping Theory" as a founding principle of communist ideology.5 That
the incorporation of rule of law into the PRC Constitution was offset by
the inclusion of an additional "-ism" is characteristic of the party's
tendency to consolidate its authority behind the guise of
constitutionalism. 6
As part of the process of providing a theoretical justification for
China's current pro-capitalist course, the most recent addition to the party
ideological repertoire effectively alters the fundamental makeup of the
CPC itself. Presented by Jiang Zemin in February 2000 as the cornerstone
for the CPC's governance,57 and subsequently incorporated into the PRC
Constitution in March 2004,58 the doctrine of the "Three Represents" (san
ge daibiao) mandates that the CPC pursue economic prosperity by
embodying: first, the development of China's advanced productive forces;
second, the orientation of China's advanced culture; and third, the
fundamental interests of the overwhelming majority of the Chinese
people. 9 Though the inclusion of yet another ideology within the preamble
may seem like bowing to dogma, the cryptic language of the "Three
Represents" is actually part of a larger effort to incorporate a new social
stratum of non-working classes into the communist fold.' By some
of socialist spiritual civilization is necessary to provide a "powerful spiritual driving force and
mental support for modernization").
54. See Stefan Landsberger, "Get Up, Stand Up": The Power of Chinese Patriotism, available
at http://www.nottingham.ac.uk/iaps/LandsbergerABS.pdf (last visited June 1, 2005).
55. See PartyPaperEditorialMarks ClosureofNPCSession, XINHUANEWS AGENCY, Mar.
15, 1999. Following the devastation left behind by the Cultural Revolution, Deng Xiaoping
redefined the fundamental task of the CPC as the promotion of economic reconstruction and
opening up. See Qiao Shi Speech, supranote 52.
56. See Lubman, supra note 10, at 399.
57. See Norihiro Sasaki, Transfer of PowerfromJiangto Hu: the CPC's Transformation,in
CHINA'S NEW LEADERSHIP 20 (Yasuo Onishi ed., 2003).
58. See XIAN FA pmbl. § 7 (1982) (amended 2004).
59. See People to Get More Rights, BEUING REv., Jan. 15, 2004, available at
http://www.bjreview.com.cn/200403/Cover-200403(A).htm (last visited June 1,2005). According
to Norihiro Sasaki, the "Three Represents" requires the CPC to pursue the following goals: (1)
develop the productive forces necessary for economic progress; (2) absorb the foreign knowledge
required for developing such productive power as scientific technology and human resources while
maintaining a culture of Communism; and (3) cultivate those benefits that give satisfaction to the
greatest number of people. Sasaki, supra note 57, at 19-20.
60. According to recent statistics, 59.5% of the Ninth "Chinese People's Political
Consultative Congress" (CPPCC) members and 63.4% of its Standing Committee were comprised

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2005

11

Florida Journal of International Law, Vol. 17, Iss. 2 [2005], Art. 3

FLORIDA JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW

[Vol. 17

estimates, the percentage of industrial and agricultural workers in China
dropped from 87.2% of the total population in 1978 to 66.6% by 2002.61
This decline was accompanied by an unprecedented growth in the number
of blue collar workers, cadres, intellectuals, soldiers, as well as such
members of the "advanced social strata" as entrepreneurs, professionals,
and technicians.62 In an effort to maintain its status as the representative of
the "overwhelming majority," the CPC has thus decided to accept
"outstanding elements" of China's changing demographics as both an
"advanced productive force" for economic development and an important
constituent of its "advanced culture. 63
Given their long-standing status as enemies of the party, the official
recognition of private entrepreneurs as constituents of the CPC has
attracted the most attention, and raised the most eyebrows.' According to
the State Economic and Trade Commission, by 2002, private enterprises
contributed 9.3% of the total industrial and commercial tax, comprised up
to 60% of the GDP, and hired 70% of the workers who had been laid off
through the restructuring of national enterprises. 65 Aware of their
indispensable role for the development of the Chinese economy and
motivated, at least in part, by their increasing political clout, Jiang Zemin
formally admitted capitalists to the CPC in November 2002 by identifying
them as "builders of socialism with Chinese characteristics." Their
of people from the "new social stratum" and other nonaffiliated "patriots." See China'sHuman
Rights Progress:Eight Historic Changes, China.org, May 13, 2003, available at http://www.
china.taiwan.org/web/webportal/W5042137/Uadmin/A5045836.html.
61. See Sasaki, supra note 57, at 20.
62. Jiang Zemin's so-called "new social stratum" specifically includes, though is not
necessarily limited to: entrepreneurs and technical personnel employed by private enterprises;
managerial and technical staff employed by foreign-funded enterprises; the self-employed; private
entrepreneurs; employees in intermediaries; and freelance professionals. See Li Minsheng,
Entrepreneursfrom Non-Public Sector Hail Jiang's Speech, BEIJING REV., 2001, available at
http://www.bjreview.com.cn/2001/200132/CoverStory-200132.htm (last visited June 1, 2005).
63. The second prong of the 'Three Represents," the orientation of China's so-called
"advanced culture," refers to the assimilation of those aspects of foreign culture required for the
development of such "productive forces" as scientific technology and human resources. See Sasaki,
supra note 57, at 19.
64. Ever since the founding of the PRC in 1949, the word "private" has been a common
target of attack: slogans like "Destroy the word private whenever it appears" was common
throughout China while private firms, although legalized in 1978, could only be called minying
("citizen-operated") enterprises for a long period of time. See Constitutionto ClarifyPrivateRights,
XINHUA NEWS AGENCY, Jan. 5, 2004.
65. See Sasaki, supra note 57, at 21.
66. See Eva Cheng, China: Constitution Changeto PromotePrivateProperty,GREEN LEFT
WKLY., Mar. 10, 2004, availableat http://www.greenlefl.org.au/back/2004/574/574p2l .htm (last
visited June, 1, 2005).
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elevated status was subsequently codified in the 2004 amendment to
paragraph 10 of the preamble, which seeks to include "the builders of the
to the
cause of socialism" into the "patriotic united front," a reference
67
Chinese People's Political Consultative Congress (CPPCC).
Note that party membership is by no means unconditional. Private
entrepreneurs, and members of the new social strata in general, must meet
fairly stringent requirements before they can be deemed suitable
candidates.68 Many current CPC members consist of either "xiahai,"
former government cadres who have "jumped into the sea" of the private
sector and therefore possessed some degree of political power to begin
with, or wealthy managers of large companies who have amassed
considerable economic power.6 9 Some have proposed that extending party
membership to affluent businesspeople, undoubtedly attractive for their
potential monetary contributions, may also be intended to prevent them
from using their influence to engage in subversive activities against the
central government.70
There are several ways to interpret the underlying intent of the "Three
Represents" and its associated references to private entrepreneurs. Rather
than discounting it as another obscure ideology aimed at legitimizing
authoritarian rule, some have suggested that the "Three Represents"
effectively reinforces the legality of the CPC's authority by laying out a
specific agenda by which the people may assess its performance. 7 ' In the
absence of any of the "Three Represents," so goes the argument, the CPC
would lose its rightful place as the governing party.7 2 Staking political
legitimacy on the creation of economic prosperity is generally a risky
venture, however, and it is difficult to imagine a scenario in which the
CPC would relinquish its power following an economic recession.73

67. See XAN FA pmbl. § 10 (1982) (amended 2004).
68. No more than 19.8% of all private entrepreneurs were allowed to join the party in 2001.
See Sasaki, supra note 57, at 22.
69. See id.
70. See, e.g., Zhong Mingzu, Minzhu Zhengzhi Jianshu Yao Cong Zhongguo Shyi Chufa:
JianpingGuchuiXifangMinzhu ZiyouDe Guandian[TheEstablishmentofDemocracy must Begin
with Chinese Reality: Views on Assessing and Promoting Western Democratic Freedom], 20
QIUsIR, 2000; see also Sasaki, supra note 57, at 22.
71. See People to Get More Rights, supra note 59 (pointing out that the CPC's failure to
adhere to any of the "Three Represents" could lead to the loss of its legitimacy as China's
governing party).
72. See id.
73. The language of the "Three Represents" is also not nearly specific enough to provide a
useful benchmark for citizens to assess the CPC's effectiveness as the governing party.
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The doctrine may also be viewed as part of a progressive effort by the
CPC to shore up its legitimacy and expand its support base by reaching out
to newly emerging loci of social and economic power. 74 This is borne out
by the selectivity with which the CPC recruits its previously nonaffiliated
members as well as the so-called xiahai phenomenon.75 Whatever the
underlying intent of the "Three Represents" amendment turns out to be,
however, its implications for China's economic modernization are clear:
the private sector is to gain more official support while the interests of
capital will be given renewed emphasis.76
There is one ideological conflict within the doctrine of the "Three
Represents" that remains to be resolved. In its eagerness to develop
China's "advanced productive forces" by affording wealthy capitalists
preferential treatment, the CPC may soon find itself unable to represent the
"fundamental interests of the overwhelming majority" by providing relief
for the poor and socially vulnerable.7 7 China's modernization policy has
already exacerbated existing economic disparities between its small
fraction of urban elite and the hundreds of millions of peasants far
removed from the country's new-found wealth. 78 Farmers are denied an
education because they cannot afford tuition, and urban residents are
forced to relinquish their property to government appropriation and
commercial development. 79 Although Jiang Zemin offered his assurances
that the "Three Represents" does not deviate from traditional Marxist
theory, it is also difficult to discern how a legitimacy founded on economic
prosperity within a free market system can be reconciled with the Marxist
claim that socialism will inevitably succeed capitalism in its ultimate

74. See Subrahmanyan, supra note 7.
75. See supra text accompanying notes 68-70.
76. The amendment should, for example, have an impact on private enterprises' limited
access to credit, which has been one of the most often-cited indications of the unequal treatment
of private and state-owned businesses as well as one of the most common grievances of the private
sector in China. See Subrahmanyan, supra note 7.
77. See Sasaki, supra note 57, at 23.
78. See, e.g., Joseph Kahn & Jim Yardley, The Great Divide: Amid China's Boom, No
Helping Hand for Young Qingming, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 1, 2004, § 1, at 1 (reporting on the
circumstances surrounding the death of a young Chinese peasant who committed suicide after being
unable to afford to take the college entrance examination).
79. Id.; see Zhangfan, Sichan Baohu Luxian Tu [A Roadmapfor the Protectionof Private
Property],CHINAECON. TIMES, Mar. 17,2004 (discussing the ideological foundations and practical
implications of China's "privatization roadmap"); Xie Guangfei, Anzhao Xianfa Jingshen Jianli
Gongmin Chanquan Zhidu [Establishinga System of Private PropertyRights According to the
Spirit of the Constitution], CHINA ECON. TIMES (China), Mar. 17, 2004 (discussing the need to
establish a mechanism capable of assessing the constitutionality of existing laws and regulations),
availableat http://www.cet.com.cn; see also Constitutionto Clarify PrivateRights, supra note 64.
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evolution towards the communist ideal." In a nation founded on the
workers and peasants as a core constituency of the Communist Party, the
CPC's willingness to embrace capitalism for the sake of economic
progress runs the risk of alienating the vast majority of China's populace
while repudiating the socialist heritage upon which the country still
relies.8
Well aware of these internal contradictions, the CPC has gone to great
lengths not to undermine its egalitarian claim to legitimacy by branding
capitalism as an evil to be replaced. This is why large segments of
constitutional text referring to the Marxist revolution have been deleted
entirely. 2 The declaration that "China is currently in the primary stage of
socialism" has likewise been amended to read, "China will stay in the
primary stage of socialism for a long time" - presumably an indication
that the Marxist revolution will take longer than expected. 83 Counterintuitive arguments have also been made to the effect that the private
sector is now an integral element of the centrally planned socialist
economy. 84 With few exceptions, the CPC has adhered to the disingenuous
policy of encouraging the private sector while avoiding its existence in
ideology, and of dismantling the public sector while proclaiming its
importance. The party tactic of repeatedly changing policy while
maintaining its ostensible conformity with established ideology seems to
derive from the notion that political legitimacy somehow depends on
ideological consistency - only by embracing the forces driving change

80. See Jiang Zemin, Speech at the Meeting Celebrating the 80th Anniversary of the
Founding of the Communist Party of China, July 1,2001 (reiterating the belief that human society
will inevitably move towards communism but maintaining that the exact course of the Marxist
revolution cannot be predicted with accuracy), availableathttp://www.china.org.cn/e-speech/a.htm
(last visited June 1, 2005).
81. See Kahn & Yardley, supranote 78.
82. The text of pre-1982 PRC Constitutions used to make claims of the following type:
"Although socialism has its turns and twists and its repetition, it is a general non-retrogressive trend
of historical development of society that communism never fails to take the place of capitalism."
See Sasaki, supra note 57, at 22.
83. XIAN FA pmbl. § 7 (1982) (amended 1999).
84. See, e.g., Li Minsheng, supranote 62 (contending that "only with the development of the
non-public economy can overall social development be achieved, which will eventually lead to the
real success of socialism and accomplishment of communism").
85. See Constitution to Clarify Private Rights, supra note 64; Cheng, supra note 66
(describing the Chinese government's campaign to transform state firms into shareholding
companies).
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does the CPC seem to think that can it retain control.8 6 The phenomenon
can be seen in the nature of the PRC Constitution itself, which must be
regularly altered to conform to the realities of economic modernization,
and which presents Marxism-Leninism, Mao Zedong Thought, Deng
as if they were
Xiaoping Theory, and Jiang Zemin's "Three
7 Represents"
thought.1
of
line
continuous
one
of
all part
Stanley Lubman has described the PRC Constitution as more of a guide
to the CPC's ideological agenda at a particular moment in time than a
document codifying fundamental rights.88 Considering the often glaring
discrepancies between the rights provided for in the Constitution and those
actually enjoyed by the populace, the effects of constitutional revisionism
in China may indeed be largely symbolic. The failure to designate private
entrepreneurs as "builders of socialism," for instance, did nothing to
prevent them from comprising 13.1% of total CPC membership in 1993,
more than ten years before the 2004 amendment.8 9 Nor did the absence of
constitutional protection afforded private businesses thwart would-be
capitalists from entering the private sector, though the recent amendments
will no doubt make it more convenient by strengthening the rule of law in
commercial transactions.9" Essentially, the four series of constitutional
amendments since 1982 have prompted changes in the law which enable
Chinese people to do what they were already doing but without legal
guidelines or protections. Though it may seem strange to proponents of
rights-based constitutionalism, this is entirely in keeping with the socialist
model of law as a superstructure of ideas reflecting the economic and
materialist basis of society. 9 As China advances towards its ideal socialist

86. See Lubman, supranote 10, at 404; Subrahmanyan, supra note 7 ("The party leadership
seem to think that the more consistent they can claim to be, the more legitimate they are"); see also
China EmbracesPropertyRights, supra note 2.
87. The amendments may also derive from the reverential attitude to authority that is a
cornerstone of the Maoist tradition, in which the CPC strives to maintain the notion that its
leadership is omniscient and infallible. See Subrahmanyan, supra note 7 (arguing that "[flor any
leader of China to admit that his predecessors in the party were wrong would indirectly undermine
his own legitimacy").
88. According to Lubman, the PRC Constitution "defines the direction that the communist
party is marching in at the particular moment, rather than endowing citizens with rights that are
fundamental." See Subrahmanyan, supra note 7.
89. See Cheng, supra note 66.
90. See China Embraces PropertyRights, supra note 2.
91. According to the party line, "[l]aw is a manifestation of the will of the people, and the
amendment of the constitution itself is a vivid manifestation of the governance according to law."
See Li Shufeng et al., ProvideLegal Guaranteefor Rejuvenating the Nation - On the Occasion
of the 20th Anniversary of the Promulgationof the PresentConstitution, XuqHUA NEWS AGENCY,
Dec. 3, 2002. This is in direct contrast to the Western constitutional tradition based on the notion
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state and the economy changes accordingly, constitutional amendments are
only to be expected.92
Pursuant to Article 64 of the PRC Constitution, the CPC has
established an elaborate series of legally prescribed procedures for the
proposal and examination of draft resolutions.93 In order to maintain
stability while ensuring that the revisions fully represent the people's will,
constitutional amendments may only be proposed when conditions are ripe
and must be implemented according to the "two principles" of
"scientificalness" [sic] and "democracy" - the former referring to the
necessity of ensuring the rationality and legality of the amendments and
the revisions procedure, and the latter focusing on the need to entertain the
views of the populace by submitting proposed amendments to the people
for a public referendum.94 In theory at least, the amendment procedure
seems to closely adhere to these principles. Draft resolutions originate with
the Secretariat of the CPC Central Committee, are then presented by a
constitutional amendment team to the Standing Committee of the Political
Bureau of the CPC Central Committee, subsequently disseminated to the
standing committees of the various provinces and autonomous regions for
their input, and eventually submitted to the NPC for deliberation and
ratification. 95 Meetings may also be convened to solicit the opinions and
recommendations of legal and economic experts as well as the general
populace. 96
that certain fundamental principles, such as individual liberty, are immutable regardless of how the
economic or political system evolves. See Subrahmanyan, supranote 7.
92. See Peerenboom, supra note 8, at 506; see also Yang Fan & Chung Xueping, China Said
to Revise the Constitutionin the Year after the Next, and the "Three Represents" is Expected to be
Incorporatedinto the Constitution,H.K. WEN WEI PAO (China), Dec. 15, 2002 (quoting Hu Jintao
as saying that the PRC Constitution "should undergo a process of constant improvement along with
the development of [socialist modernization] ... so that [it] can reflect the demands of the times"),
availableat http://www.wenweipo.com.
93. According to Article 64, "[a]mendments to the Constitution are to be proposed by the
Standing Committee of the National People's Congress or by more than one-fifth of the deputies
of the National People's Congress and adopted by a vote of more than two-thirds of all deputies to
the Congress." XAN FA art. 64(1) (1982).
94. The "two principles" derive from the policy of representing the fundamental interests of
the people pursuant to the third prong of the "Three Represents." See Sun Chih & Liu Ying,
Freedom of Movement to be Written into the Constitutionto ProtectHuman Rights, H.K. TAKUNG
PAO (China), Aug. 13, 2003, available at http://www.takungpao.com; Chinese Congress Leader
Li Peng on Constitution Changes,XINHUA NEWS AGENCY, Jan. 30, 1998.

95. See Jen Hui-wen, Speech by Hu Jintaoto DominateFourth ConstitutionalAmendment,
H.K. XIN PAO, Feb. 19, 2003.
96. See, e.g., Proposal on Constitution Amendment, supra note 3 (lauding the CPC's
acceptance of a radical amendments proposed by nonaffiliated scholars as an indication of the
democratic nature of the constitutional amendment process).

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2005

17

Florida Journal of International Law, Vol. 17, Iss. 2 [2005], Art. 3

FLORIDA JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW

(Vol. 17

The CPC euphemistically refers to the amendment process as
"emancipating the mind and seeking truth from facts," or more
specifically, "integrating basic Marxist tenets with China's concrete
reality."97 Symptomatic of post-Mao China's pragmatic approach towards
government in general, the practice of constitutional revision as a vehicle
for ideological reform may nonetheless pose a real danger to the stability
of the communist regime: by repeatedly changing policy in professed
accordance with existing ideology without clearly defining the
characteristics of either, the CPC threatens to undermine its own
legitimacy as the ruling party.98 While the Chinese administration likes to
attribute the success of economic reforms to Marxism-Leninism, Mao
Zedong thought, and Deng Xiaoping Theory, the general public has begun
to recognize such empty rationalizations for what they are.99 Economic
modernization and exposure to foreign values have thereby led to the
erosion of the people's faith in traditional communist ideology, a belief
already undermined by the mass disillusionment that is the most lasting
heritage of the Cultural Revolution. 100 Despite efforts to mobilize the
enthusiasm of the people by calling for the creation of "spiritual
civilization," the Constitution is viewed as increasingly hollow, its
amendments nothing more than "public relations for the current
leaders."''
The Chinese government's search for a new legitimacy under both
traditional socialist ideology and Western legal thought has engendered a
fledgling legal system that ostensibly reigns supreme over all political

97. See Qiao Shi Speech, supra note 52.
98. See Lubman, supra note 10, at 404.
99. Fang Ning, deputy director of the Institute of Politics at the Chinese Academy of Social
Sciences, discusses the ideological disillusionment of many Chinese as follows: "Marxism is about
the elimination of private property. Today, we are going to turn around and recognize private
ownership and protect [private] property. People feel very emotional about this, 'So what was our
revolution about? All that loss and sacrifice was about what?" See Cheng, supra note 66.
100. According to one disillusioned Communist, China's crisis of values has led to
"widespread spiritual malaise among people from all walks of life, a growing mood of depression,
even despair, a loss of hope for the future and of any sense of social responsibility." See Liu
BINYAN, CHINA'S CRISIS, CHINA'S HOPE 22 (1990).
101. See Sara Davis, Laws with No Teeth, S. CHINA MORNING POST, Mar. 20,2004, available
at http://www.hrw.org/english/docs/2004/04/27/china8506.htm (last visited June 1,2005). See also
Howard W. French, A Party Girl Leads China's Online Revolution, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 24, 2005,
at A14 (recounting the increasingly forthright political and social satire by such online
commentators as Wang Xiaofeng, whose blogger nickname, Dai san ge biao ("wears three
watches"), is a patent mockery of Jiang Zemin's "Three Represents").
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parties and institutions. 02
' One cannot help but notice, however, the CPC's
tendency to profess its respect for constitutionalism in theory while
blatantly ignoring it in practice.'0 3 If the 1982 PRC Constitution is the
embodiment of this grudging acceptance of rule of law as a necessary
condition for China's economic modernization and national prosperity,
many of its amendments may represent a last-ditch effort to assert the
legitimacy of China's socialist heritage. I"The following section considers
the implications of specific amendments with respect to the changing
economic, political, and social agendas of the CPC.
III. CHINA'S CONSTITUTIONAL AGENDA: "SOCIALISM WITH
CHINESE CHARACTERISTICS"

A. The Socialist Market Economy
Though some deal with ideological revision and political restructuring,
the vast majority of the amendments since 1982 are best understood as
milestones along China's road to privatization, building blocks for
establishing "socialism with Chinese characteristics."' ' As with many
Asian countries, China practices a form of managed capitalism in which
technocratic bureaucracy determines industrial policy, corporatist
relationships flourish between public officials and private businesses, and
dispute resolution takes the form of informal administrative guidance as
opposed to universally applicable laws. 01 6 Private companies are subject

102. See XAN FA art. 5 (1982) ("The state upholds the uniformity and dignity of the socialist
legal system").
103. See, e.g., ConcreteAction, supra note 12 (noting that constitutional amendments must
be followed by legal and institutional reforms in order to counteract current human rights abuses);
Davis, supra note 101 (arguing that amendments are meaningless until the government passes
legislation establishing clear standards).
104. See generally Subrahmanyan, supra note 7.
105. See XIAN FA pmbl. § 7 (1982) ("The basic task of the nation in the years to come is to
concentrate its effort on socialist modernization"); see also Hu Jintao, supra note 7 (proclaiming
that the "fundamental task of the state is to follow the path of building socialism with Chinese
characteristics").
106. See Peerenboom, supra note 8, at 491-92. Downplaying the role of law in the economic
development of Asian countries, some scholars have actually attributed their prosperity to relationbased contracting, the traditional absence of clear property rights, and the culture of corporatism
itself. See Randall Peerenboom, Asian Discourses ofRule of Law, at xvii-xix (UCLA Sch. of Law
Research Paper No. 03-15, Jan. 2004) [hereinafter Peerenboom, Asian Discourses],available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=445820 (last visited June 1, 2005).
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to the state's licensing power as well as its monopolistic control over
access to loans and technology; in some cases, economic policy may even
be influenced by government officials' financial interest in individual
firms.° 7 Although increasingly unstable, public ownership remains a pillar
of Jiang Zemin's socialist state, and is manifest in everything from the
central government's unilateral expropriation of private property to
mandatory restrictions on loan grants, taxation, and types of stock
available to private and foreign investors.' ° The socialist notion that rural
land is collectively owned while urban land belongs to the state has
provided a legal basis for governmental seizure of property without
compensation so as to make room for the development of factories and
malls.0 9 Ever since China launched its stock markets in 1991, it has also
insisted that companies maintain a certain amount of non-tradeable shares
which maynot be sold into private hands. "0
Hailed as a sea-change in the ruling party thinking, the recent
amendments bear witness to the country's increasingly pro-capitalist
course."' On April 12, 1988, the First Session of the Seventh NPC
amended Article 11, formally endorsing the existence and development of
the private sector as a supplement to the public economy."t 2 Appearing two
years after the first draft of the General Principles of the Civil Law
(GPCL)," 3 which already contained various provisions on private contract
relations, this was the first official recognition of the private sector in

107. Some have suggested that China is experiencing the emergence of a "corporatist" state
in which private actors "reflect state motives and state action" and corruption thrives on the
"interpenetration" of government and business. See Lubman, supranote 10, at 400, 408; GORDON
WHITE ET AL., IN SEARCH OF CIVIL SOCIETY 126 (1996).
108. See Peerenboom, supra note 8, at 492.
109. See Guangfei, supra note 79; Zhangfan, supranote 79 (discussing the case of a Chinese
taxi driver forced to leave his apartment after it was expropriated by the government).
110. Beijing has since eased its regulation of the stock market several times: initially allowing
only "small and medium-sized state firms" to engage in trading, it subsequently restricted "nontradeable" state shares only to those firms of "strategic importance" to the Chinese economy, and
recently allowed all companies to trade their "non-tradeable" shares so long as fifty percent of the
tradeable shareholders consent. See Cheng, supra note 66.
111. For an official synopsis of the 1988, 1993, and 1999 amendments, see Shufeng et al.,
supra note 91.
112. See XIAN FA art. 11 (1982) (amended 1998) ("[t]he State permits the private sector of the
economy to exist and develop within the limits prescribed by law. The private sector of the
economy is a complement to the socialist public economy").
113. See Zhonghua Renmin Gonghe Guo Minfa Tongze [General Principles of the Civil Law
of the P.R.C.], adopted Apr. 12, 1986 by the Fourth Session of the Sixth National People's
Congress, translatedin Whitmore Gray & Henry Ruiheng Zheng, General Principlesof the Civil
Law of the P.R.C., 52 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 27-87 (1989).
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Communist China. l l4 A related amendment granted permission for the
transfer of land-use rights.' 15
March 29, 1993 witnessed the ratification of no less than nine
additional revisions, at least four of which were meant to clarify the
position and role of nonpublic ownership in China. 16 Article 15 introduced
the idea of a "socialist market economy" (shehui zhuyi shichangingii)
into the official discourse to legitimate the full-scale restoration of
capitalism that had already taken place several years before,117 Article 7
replaced prior references' 8 to the "state economy" with allusions to the
"state-owned economy,"" and Articles 16 and 17 eased restrictions on the
decision-making authority of state enterprises and collective economic
organizations." 9
On March 15, 1999, the private sector was elevated once again from its
supplementary status to become a "major component" of the socialist
market economy. 20 Though public ownership of the means of production
was to remain dominant, the inclusion of vague but suggestive references
to the development of "diverse sectors of the economy" and the
"coexistence of a variety of modes of distribution" reflects a pragmatic
acceptance of the private sector in spite of China's legacy of antipathy and
distrust towards private property rights.' 2
Critics have argued that by continuing to subordinate the protection of
private property to that of public property, the 1999 amendments did not

114. See Subrahmanyan, supranote 7.
115. See XIAN FA art. 10 (1982) (amended 1998) ("The right to the use of land may be
transferred according to law").
116. See Eighth NationalPeople'sCongress Work Report,XINHUA NEWS AGENCY, Mar. 22,
1998.
117. XLN FA art. 15 (1982) (amended 1993) ("The state has put into practice a socialist
market economy"). For a discussion of the CPC's efforts to justify the introduction of capitalism
into the socialist state, see supra text accompanying notes 82-87.
118. XIAN FA art. 7 (1982) (amended 1993) ("The State-owned economy... is the leading
force in the national economy").
119. Id.art. 16 (1982) (amended 1993) (redacting the provision subjecting state enterprises'
decision-making power to "unified leadership by the State" and the "fulfill[ment of] their
obligations under the State plan"); id.
art. 17 (removing the provision requiring collective economic
organizations to "accept the guidance of the State plan").
120. Id. art. 11 (1982) (amended 1999) ("Individual, private and other non-public economies
that exist within the limits prescribed by law are essential components of the socialist market
economy").
121. Id.art. 6 (1982) (amended 1999) ("the State adheres to the basic economic system with
the public ownership remaining dominant and diverse sectors of the economy developing side by
side, and to the distribution system with the distribution according to work remaining dominant and
the coexistence of a variety of modes of distribution").
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go far enough.' 22 Provisions supporting the economic interests and
property of capitalists have been present in China economic policy since
the adoption of the Common Principles (gongtong wangling) in 1949,
though most have been part of a larger scheme to gradually eliminate the
private sector altogether. 23
' The 1982 Constitution similarly guarantees the
"right of citizens to own lawfully earned income, savings, houses and
other lawful property., 124 It does not, however, refer to private property as
"sacred and inviolable," nor does it provide for its protection as one of the
"fundamental rights of citizens."1 25 This failure to endow private property
with a legal inviolability similar to that of state property has given rise to
various implicit conditions and limitations on its protection. 126 Chinese
legal scholars argue that even the constitutions of developed countries like
Italy and Japan impose restrictions on private property in the interests of
the public good. They also point out that many, including the United
States, provide for its lawful expropriation by the government. 127 In China,
however, the unequal treatment of public and private property has
particularly harsh consequences: private enterprises suffer discrimination
in the form of unfair taxation and stringent loan qualifications, and
individual property rights are wilfully trampled
upon by the government
128
in the interests of economic development.
This is why the 2004 amendments to Articles 11 and 13 have drawn
such widespread interest. The proclamation that "[c]itizens' lawful private
122. In fact, many legal scholars had initially appealed to put private assets of Chinese citizens
on an equal footing with public property by adding an article on the inviolability of private
property, but the proposal met with strong opposition within the CPC and was abandoned prior to
the adoption of the 1999 amendments. See Constitution to Clarify PrivateRights, supra note 64.
123. See Zhangfan, supra note 79. A provisional PRC Constitution drafted immediately
following the establishment of the PRC in 1949, the Common Principles reflects the CPC's belief
that the temporary protection of private businesses was necessary to meet the challenge of
economic recovery following decades of war. See Morikawa, supra note 31.
124. XIAN FA art. 13 (1982) ("The state protects the right of citizens to own lawfully earned
income, savings, houses and other lawful property. The state protects by law the right of citizens
to inherit private property").
125. Id.art. 12 (1982) ("Socialist public property is sacred and inviolable"); see also A Look
Through Expert Eyes, supra note 1 (arguing that the inclusion of private property rights under the
"General Principles" section of the PRC Constitution rather than the section on "The Fundamental
Rights of Citizens" has contributed to the unequal treatment of public and private property).
126. While the law is strictly enforced when state assets are infringed, the protection ofprivate
property is often ineffective. See Short Commentary: Amending Constitution to ProtectPrivate
Property,H.K. TA KuNG PAO (China), Aug. 12,2003 [hereinafter Short Commentary] (advocating
equal protection ofpublic and private property in China), availableat http://www.takungpao.com.
127. See People to Get More Rights, supra note 59.
128. For a discussion of some of the more rampant personal property infringements in China,
see Zhangfan, supra note 79; see also Short Commentary, supranote 126.
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property is inviolable" presumably places the protection of private
property on par with that of public property. 29 The state's pledge to
"protect the lawful rights and interests of the non-public sectors of the
economy" as well as the "rights of citizens to private property" 3 ° has been
hailed as the beginning of the end for the system of public ownership in
China. 3 ' Its potential impact on the development and protection of
intangible capital such as intellectual property is also eagerly
anticipated. 3 2 Whereas the preceding draft of Article 11 called for China
to "guide, supervise, and manage" the private sector, the revised version
requires the state to take a more active role to "encourage and support" the
development of the private sector, suggesting that many of the previous
restrictions on its expansion will soon be revoked. 33
' Finally, although the
1982 Constitution already allowed for eminent domain, the state's vow to
"make compensation for any expropriation or requisition" of real or
private property is expected to alleviate the growing discontent arising
from forced relocation by the government.'3 4 The growing protection of
private property in China is perhaps best articulated in an old Chinese
proverb which has been enjoying increasing popularity on the mainland,
roughly translated as, "The homes of the poor may be entered by the wind
'
and rain, but not by the king." 135

129. See XAN FA art. 13 (1982) (amended 2004).
130. See id. arts. 11(2), 13 (1982) (amended 2004). Jinguang argues that the change in Article
13 from the "right of citizens to own lawfully earned income, savings, houses, and other lawful
property" to the "right of citizens to private property" indicates an expansion of personal property
rights as well, since such rights may also include the right to possess, the right to use, and the right
to profit. See A Look Through Expert Eyes, supranote 1; XIAN FA art. 13 (1982) (amended 2004).
131. See Li Wuzhou, supranote 2 (contending that the inclusion ofprivate property protection
in the PRC Constitution will help stimulate economic growth by liberalizing more productive forces
and create job opportunities for the populace by providing protection for capitalists).
132. See Joseph, supra note 1.
133. XIAN FA art. 11 (2) (1982) (amended 2004) ("The State shall encourage, support and guide
the development of the non-public sectors of the economy and shall, in accordance with law,
exercise supervision and control over the non-public sectors of the economy"); see also A Look
Through Expert Eyes, supra note 1.
134. XIAN FA art. 10(3) (1982) (amended 2004) ("The State may, in the public interest and in
accordance with the provisions of law, expropriate or requisition land for its use and shall make
compensation for any land expropriated or requisitioned"); id. art. 13 (containing a similar
provision for the expropriation of private property); see also A Look Through Expert Eyes, supra
note I (arguing that protection of private property is incomplete without economic compensation).
135. See Xue Limai, Xian fa Bu Jinjin Shi Yi Zhang "Zhi" [The Constitution is notjust a
"Piece of Paper"],CHINA ECON. TIMES, June 4, 2004; see Zhangfan, supra note 79 ("quiongren
de hanshefengnengjin, ii nengjin, guowang bu nengjin").
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B. Socialist Democracy and De Facto Federalism
Analysts tend to emphasize the role of privatization as a key
component of China's economic reforms, and the majority of the
constitutional amendments since 1982 have indeed focused on
strengthening the private sector. What remains less evident, however, is
exactly what effect China's economic restructuring plan will have on its
system of socialist democracy. According to Chinese Communist ideology
since the end of the Cultural Revolution, democracy is a prerequisite to
socialism and the policy of "socialist modernization" as laid out by Deng
Xiaoping.136
The PRC Constitution itself proclaims that the authority of the CPC is
derived from the people and exercised via the NPC and the various local
congresses.'37 The promotion of democracy in China is also closely
aligned with the improvement of its legal system and, more recently, the
introduction of rule of law.1 8 Given that socialism in China is
characterized by restrictions on suffrage, suppression of subversive speech,
and a lack of individual rights, however, it is difficult to reconcile the
Chinese political apparatus with traditional Western notions of liberal
democracy. 3 9 Democracy in the West requires certain fundamental civil
and political rights which must be protected against the tyranny of the
majority, as well as a system in which individual autonomy takes
precedence over social solidarity."
Chinese democracy downplays the connection between political
representation and the individual freedom of its citizens, and conceives of
individual rights as positivist grants of the state that are necessarily

136. See, e.g., Qiao Shi Speech, supra note 52 ("People's democracy is the essence and core
of things which are required by socialism. Without democracy, there will be no socialism and
socialist modernization").
137. XIAN FA art. 2 (1982) ("All power in the People's Republic of China belongs to the
people. The organs through which the people exercise state power are the National People's
Congress and the local people's congresses at different levels").
138. See Qiao Shi Speech, supra note 52 (stating that the promotion of democracy must be
combined with the improvement of the legal system).
139. Randall Peerenboom offers a provisional working definition of democracy as comprised
of three distinct elements: the electoraldimension (requiring universal suffrage for the election of
important political figures), the participatoryprocess dimension (requiring sufficient freedom of
association, speech, and press to ensure that candidates can compete effectively in the electoral
process), and the rule of law dimension (requiring legal institutions to ensure that these freedoms
are realized and that elections are carried out fairly). Peerenboom, Asian Discourses,supra note
106, at xix.
140. See Peerenboom, supranote 8, at 494.

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/fjil/vol17/iss2/3

24

Blanchard: Constitutional Revisionism in the PRC: "Seeking Truth from Facts"

CONSTITUTIONAL REVISIONISM IN THE PRC "SEEKING TRUTH FROMFACTS"

trumped by the collective interests of the masses.' 4 ' If democracy is a form
of government in which sovereignty is exercised by a collective body of
free citizens, China cannot be a democratic nation since references to "the
people," although increasingly broad, continues to exclude any opponent
or critic of the government. 42
' This is the essence of the people democratic
dictatorship: democracy by the people is applied to the people, while
dictatorship by the people is applied to the opponents of the people, i.e.
anyone critical of the socialist state.143
The hegemony of China's ruling party as well as the supremacy of its
parliament are also incompatible with conventional notions of democracy.
As the only means for holding elected officials accountable for their
collective actions, political parties lie at the heart of American politics."
According to E.E. Schattschneider, "political parties created democracy,
and ... democracy is unthinkable save in terms of parties."' 45 Despite
some of the misleading rhetoric of its leaders, however, China's
democratic dictatorship remains a single-party state under the absolute
authority of the CPC. Therefore, when Hu Jintao talks of perfecting the
system of "multi-party cooperation" and "political consultation," he is
actually referring to making the CPC more responsive to the public, not
sharing power with opposition parties.'46 The Chinese political system is
founded on the dual notions of democratic centralism (minzhujizhong zhi)
and parliamentary supremacy (yihui zhishang)'4 7 While the U.S.
Constitution ensures that the authority of the federal government is derived

141. See id. at 494-95; Morikawa, supranote 31. The idea that the PRC Constitution protects
preexisting fundamental rights, rather than merely endowing citizens with rights at the discretion
of the state, has also gradually found its way into Chinese legal consciousness. See, e.g., Xue Limai,
supra note 135 ("[c]itizen's rights as laid out in the PRC Constitution are fundamental rights that
citizens should have at the outset, and not merely rights bestowed by the Constitution itself").
142. See supra text accompanying note 40; see also XIAN FA pmbl. (1982) ("The Chinese
people must fight against those forces and elements, both at home and abroad, that are hostile to
China's socialist system and try to undermine it").
143. See Morikawa, supranote 31.
144. See JoHN H. ALDRICH, WHY PARTIES? THE ORIGIN AND TRANSFORMATION OF POLITICAL
PARTIES INAMERICA 3 (1995) (arguing that since government policy is typically determined by the
collective action of many individual officeholders, political parties provide the only means for
holding elected officials accountable for much of their actions).
145. Id.But see Peerenboom,Asian Discourses,supranote 106, at xix (maintaining that some
measure of democratization may be possible even within a single-party state).
146. See Hu Jintao, supra note 7 (proclaiming that China has "adhered to and perfected the
system of multi-party cooperation and political consultation under CCP leadership"); see also
China Embraces PropertyRights, supranote 2.
147. XIAN FA art. 3 (1982) ("[t]he state organs of the People's Republic of China apply the
principle of democratic centralism").
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from the consent of the individual states,'48 legislative powers enjoyed by
localities in China are explicitly granted to them at the discretion of the
central government. 4 9 Because the congress is the only governmental
organ composed of representative of the "people," socialist democracy
also requires that local legislatures, as well as the courts, remain
subordinate to the supreme leadership of the NPC and the NPCSC.' 50 In
this respect, Chinese constitutionalism is not unlike that of England, where
the British parliament performs the dual role of both the executive and the
legislature in the exercise of national sovereignty. 151
It is ironic that the "fundamental task of the state" to promote economic
reform would result in the gradual diffusion of the state's economic and
political decision-making authority, but this is what seems to be happening
in China.'52 Economic liberalization has put cracks into the edifice of the
socialist state. 153 As privatization creates employment alternatives in the
non-state sector, people enjoy greater personal freedom, and China's civil
and intellectual life distances itself from government and party control,
individuals can now own their own homes, travel abroad, surf the Internet,
and speak more freely than would have been deemed possible in 1979.'
Aware of the positive effects of local administration on the productivity of
both private and state-owned firms, the CPC has gradually shifted
regulatory power over economic policy to local governments, 155
a
federalism."'
"market-enhancing
as
to
referred
sometimes
phenomenon
By offering tax breaks, reduced bureaucratic interference, and enhanced
legal enforcement of property rights, local jurisdictions have been able to
create regulatory environments more conducive to business and more

148. See U.S. CONST. amend. X ("[t]he powers not delegated to the United States by the
Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the
people"); see also Peerenboom, supra note 8, at 489.
149. See Li Yahong, supranote 45, at 125 (explaining why China may no longer be a unitary
state).
150. Democratic centralism is the antithesis of the doctrine of separation of powers practiced
in the United States. See Morikawa, supra note 31.
151. See Chen, supra note 11, at 427; see supra text accompanying notes 37-38. Under the
doctrine of "Sovereignty of Parliament," the Acts passed by the English Parliament are virtually
unchallengeable before the courts of England. See George Wang & Priscilla Leung, One Country,
Two Systems: Theory into Practice,7 PAC. RIM L. & POL'Y J.279, 308 (1998).
152. See Lubman, supra note 10, at 402.
153. See Dorn, supra note 17, at A16.
154. Id. Much of the relaxation of state intervention in the lives of the Chinese populace is
attributable to the working conditions of private enterprises, which typically exercise much less
control over their employees both within and outside the workplace. See Lubman, supra note 10,
at 402-03. See also French, supra note 101.
155. See Dougherty & McGuckin, supra note 10.
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attractive to foreign investors.156 This is no doubt part of the rationale
behind the government's decision to grant unprecedented legislative
autonomy to the Special Economic Zones (SEZs).'7 At the same time, the
state has also begun to channel public assistance programs such as
housing, social security, and medical services through local governments,
a trend indicated by the 2004 amendment of Article 14 calling for the
establishment and improvement of the social security system.' 58
Yet despite the increasing incompatibility of communist ideology,
single-party rule and economic modernization, the CPC and the central
government have nonetheless managed to retain a considerable amount of
political authority. The party still appoints provincial governors, its control
over non-fiscal matters such as bank credit continues to impose harsh
budget constraints on many localities, and the list of legislative powers
reserved exclusively to the central government is exhaustive.' 59 Under the
Legislative Procedure Law of 2000 (Law-Making Law), 160 the NPC and
the NPCSC may legislate on matters concerning national sovereignty,
congressional and judicial organization, the basic self-governance of
citizens, crime and punishment, the appropriation of private property, the
civil, economic, and judicial systems, as well as any other matters that
must be legislated by the NPC and its Standing Committee. 16 1 Specific
legislative powers exercisable by localities are referred to only in the most
general terms. 62 In the absence of well-defined central legislation in a
given area, local governments may enact their own laws under the longstanding practice of "advanced legislation," though such laws may be
63
annulled if found to be inconsistent with subsequent national legislation.'

156. Id.
157. Under the Law-Making Law, for example, only the State Council and the SEZs have the
authority to legislate in areas reserved exclusively to the central government. See Law-Making Law
arts. 9, 10, 11, 56 & 65 (2000); see also Li Yahong, supra note 45, at 129.
158. XIAN FA art. 14(4) (1982) (amended 2004) ("[t]he State establishes a sound social security
system compatible with the level of economic development"); see also Lubman, supranote 10, at
402-03. The fact that many of these social services were previously only available through public
enterprises, offices, and organizations used to give the Chinese government enormous power over
all public employees. Id.
159. See Dougherty & McGuckin, supra note 10.
160. See Law-Making Law art. 42 (2000).
161. See id. art. 8.
162. The Law-Making Law provides only that local legislatures may legislate on:
implementing laws and administrative regulations; matters whose regulation must be based on local
circumstances; and matters pertaining to local affairs. See id. art. 64; Li Yahong, supranote 45, at
128.
163. See Law-Making Law art 64(2) (2000).
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In general, although there is no clear provision for the distribution of
residuary legislative powers, the exclusive power of the NPC and NPCSC
to enact laws on any matter that may be legislated by them seems to
bestow on the central government unfettered discretion in this respect. 1"'
The CPC's policy of fiscal decentralization, coupled with it reluctance
to relinquish political control, has led some to suggest the possibility of
China pursuing a form of "economic rule of law," in which the legal
system operates independently from political influence with respect to
commercial matters while other areas of the law remain subject to varying
degrees of politicization. 65 Another, perhaps more likely, prospect is that
the post-Mao liberalization of the Chinese economy will eventually give
rise to greater political decentralization as well.'66 As the state economy,
and therefore the resources available to the central government, continues
to contract, the CPC monopoly on power will inevitably deteriorate.'67
Some measure of voluntary political diffusion is already evident in the
2004 amendment of Article 98, which extends the term of office of
grassroots congresses from three to five years. 61 In addition to facilitating
consistency with respect to the timing of central and local elections, the

Except for matters enumerated in Article 8 hereof, in respect of any other matter
for which the state has not enacted national law or administrative regulation, the
People's Congress of a province, autonomous region, or municipality directly
under the central government and the Standing Committee thereof may enact local
decrees for the time being in light of its specific situations and actual needs.
Where a national law or administrative regulation enacted by the state has come
into force, any provision in the local decree which contravenes it shall be invalid,
and the enacting body shall amend or repeal such provision on a timely basis.
Id. Note that residuary legislative powers in most federalist states cannot be annulled once they
have been granted. See Li Yahong, supra note 45, at 130.
164. See Law-Making Law art. 8 (2000). This provision has been compared to the "necessary
and proper" clause of the U.S. Constitution, though China has no independent judiciary to resolve
potential conflicts between the center and localities. See Li Yahong, supranote 45, at 130.
165. See Peerenboom, Asian Discourses,supra note 106, at xviii-xix. Though such a system
has arguably existed at some point in Taiwan, South Korea, and Singapore, most scholars agree that
a mixed rule of law is not likely to be sustainable due to the spillover effects as institutional actors
attempt to increase their autonomy and authority. See Peerenboom, supra note 8, at 517.
166. According to the evolutionary theses of modernization theorists, legal and economic
reforms inevitably lead to political reforms and in particular the establishment of liberal
democracies. See Peerenboom, Asian Discourses,supra note 106, at xix.
167. See Dorm, supranote 17, atAl 6 (arguing that the continued shrinkage ofthe public sector
in China will eventually render the CPC obsolete).
168. XIAN FA art. 98 (1982) (amended 2004) ("[t]he term of office of people's congresses
...is five years").
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change is indicative of the party's desire to help local deputies play a more
substantive role in determining economic policy. 6 9
Perhaps the most striking indication of China's emerging federalism
has been the creation of "Special Autonomous Regions" (SARs) under
Article 31 of the Constitution." 0 In many respects, the degree of political
and economic autonomy currently enjoyed by the "Hong Kong Special
Administrative Region" (HKSAR) is greater than the rights of individual
states within federalist systems like the United States, and certainly more
extensive than the rights previously granted it as a British colony. 7 '
Although such incidents as the right of abode controversy in 1999 have
generated concern over whether the PRC intends to fulfil its obligations
under the Joint Declaration, the Basic Law of the Hong Kong Special
Administrative Region of the People's Republic of China (HKSAR's Basic
Law) guarantees it legislative autonomy, judicial independence, and final
adjudicative power.'72 Hong Kong's continued use of British common law
in accordance with Article 8 of the Basic Law reinforces this
independence.73 Some have likened Hong Kong to a type of "special
political zone" whose continued prosperity, it is hoped, will help allay
CPC fears that political liberalization is a dangerous course likely to result
in the "Russian disease" of instability and secession. 74 As things stand,
however, Hong Kong's autonomy has been conferred at the discretion of
the central authorities and is therefore necessarily delimited by the Chinese

169. See A Look Through Expert Eyes, supra note 1.
170. XAN FA art. 31 (1982) ("The state may establish special administrative regions when
necessary. The systems to be instituted in special administrative regions shall be prescribed by law
enacted by the National People's Congress in the light of the specific conditions").
171. See Jing Huang & Andrew Xuefeng Qian, "One Country, Two Systems, " Three Law
Families,and FourLegal Regions: The Emerging Inter-Regional Conflicts of Laws in China, 5
DuKE J. COMP. & INT'L L. 289, 303-05 (1995).
172. See Basic Law of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region ofthe People's Republic
of China art. 2 (1990) [hereinafter Basic Law] ("The National People's Congress authorizes the
Hong Kong Special Administrative Region to ...enjoy executive, legislative and independent
."),
available at
judicial power, including that of final adjudication .....
http://www.info.gov.hklbasiclaw/fulltext/index.htm. For a discussion of the implications of the
right of abode controversy for the development of rule of law in Hong Kong, see generally Joseph
R. Crowley Program, One Country, Two Legal Systems?, 23 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 1 (1999).
173. See Basic Law art. 8 ("The laws previously in force in Hong Kong, that is, the common
law, rules of equity, ordinances, subordinate legislation and customary law shall be
maintained ....).
174. See Avery Goldstein, The Hong Kong Experiment: A Peek into the Laboratory, ASIA
TIMEs ONLINE, Jan. 28, 2000 (discussing the dynamic relationship between local and central
governments in China), availableat http://www.atimes.com/china/BA28Ad02.html (last visited
June 2, 2005).
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doctrine of democratic centralism. 175 In this respect, the PRC Constitution
176
may arguably be as applicable to the HKSAR as to the rest of China.
Sean Dougherty and Robert McGuckin point out some interesting
parallels between China's current experience with economic reform and
the early development of the United States under the Articles of
Confederation. 177 These are similarities which may offer some insight into
the future development of China's political structure. Faced with a high
degree of political decentralization and the federal government's uncertain
reach over economic affairs, the Chinese government and the American
confederacy have both been forced to concede to overwhelming objections
from subordinate administrations at times, and both have struggled to
preserve a common market by striking down interregional trade barriers
inhibiting competition and discouraging foreign investment. 178 It is, of
course, unlikely that China will ever evolve into a liberal democracy like
the United States, even if it were to completely do away with its centrallyplanned economy. This does not necessarily mean, however, that it may
not become a federalist state. But for this to take place, Beijing will first
have to convince itself that the diffusion of political power, implicit in the
adoption of rule of law and increasingly indispensable for national
prosperity within a market economy, will neither damage the legitimacy
179
of the CPC nor undermine local allegiance to the motherland.
175. See Heng Loong Cheung, Hong Kong SAR: Autonomy within Integration?,4 UCLA J.
INT'L L. & FOREIGN AFF. 181, 184-85 (1999). In fact, the CPC has explicitly indicated that the

SARs are not to be considered member states within a federalist nation, but rather local
administrative regions under a unified central leadership. See EstablishingSpecialAdministrative
Regions is anImportantPartof Chinese PolicyDecision,PEOPLE'S DAILY, Sept. 28, 1984; see also
supra text accompanying notes 147-51.
176. Although there is no doubt that the PRC Constitution applies to Hong Kong in some
respects, the scope of its applicability remains unclear since much of the HKSAR Basic Law is
expressly intended to preclude many of its provisions. For a discussion of the applicability of the
PRC Constitution to the HKSAR, see YASH GHAI, HONG KONG'S NEW CONSTITUTIONAL ORDER:
THE RESUMPTION OF SOVEREIGNTY AND THE BASIc LAW 398 (1999); see also Tequ Yu Zhongyang
Guanxi Zui Zhong Kan Xian fa [Relations Between Central Government and SARs Ultimately
Based on PRC Constitution], CHINA ECON. TIMES, Feb. 25, 2004 ("[w]hen dealing with the
relationship between mainland China and the HKSAR, the PRC Constitution cannot be left behind.
The Constitution is not only a constitution for the mainland but a constitution for the entirety of
China").
177. See Dougherty & McGuckin, supra note 10.
178. Under the federalist structure of the Articles of Confederation, the economies of
individual states were actually protected from encroachment by the national government. Id.
179. See Goldstein, supra note 174. China has always treated national sovereignty and
territorial integrity as a matter of principle which cannot be compromised. See, e.g., XLAN FA pmbl.
(1982) ("[i]t is the lofty duty of the entire Chinese people .. to accomplish the great task of
reunifying the motherland").
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C. A Rights-BasedApproach to Constitutionalism?
Given the disparity between rights already provided for in the PRC
Constitution and those currently exercisable by the Chinese populace, it is
not surprising that the 2004 amendment to Article 33, calling for the state
to "respect and safeguard human rights," has met with the most skepticism
from the international community.180 The 1982 Constitution ostensibly
grants equality before the law, universal suffrage to those over the age of
18, freedom of speech, of the press and of association, freedom of religion,
and even the right to criticize and seek reparations from the government.''
In practice, however, those brave enough to exercise these rights - even
those who do so to advocate for a stronger constitution - are routinely
censured or jailed.
The ironies have not gone unnoticed by the foreign press: a housing
rights activist who painted the words "Protect the Constitution" on his
clothes and then marched in front of the government offices was promptly
arrested for demonstrating; a popular writer who criticized the proposed
application of a state subversion law to Hong Kong was jailed on charges
of state subversion, but only after the government shelved the proposed
law. ' 2 Perhaps the most disconcerting instance of China's constitutional
shortcomings took place during the NPC's deliberations over the 2004
human rights amendment itself, as hundreds of peaceful demonstrators
were imprisoned for "disrupting" the NPC with appeals for the guarantee
of rights purportedly protected by the Constitution.8 3 Welcoming the
amendments as an important first step, Amnesty International recognized
these disparities when it emphasized the need for China to adopt more
practical measures by reviewing the constitutionality of existing legislation
and by drafting new laws in accordance with China's obligations under
applicable international human rights treaties.' 84

180. XIAN FA art. 33 (1982) (amended 2004) ("[t]he state respects and preserves human
rights").
181. See XIAN FA arts. 33-35,41 (1982).
182. For a description of the highly publicized cases of Liu Jinchengand Du Daobin, see
Davis, supra note 101.
183. See ConcreteAction, supra note 12.
184. See Amnesty International Press Release, supra note 13. To date, China has signed
twenty-one international human rights agreements, including the International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights (ICCPR), and ratified the International Covenant on Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights (ICESCR), the Convention Against Torture (CAT), and the Convention on the
Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW), though it has yet to
implement many of their provisions. Id.
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When confronted with international censure of its human rights
practices, China invariably responds by appealing to notions of national
sovereignty, cultural imperialism, and "Asian Values."" 5 Though typically
invoked by authoritarian regimes as justification for domestic human
rights abuses, such arguments are not altogether groundless in China's
case.' 86 One of the most enduring features of Chinese constitutionalism
since 1949 has been its collectivist rights orientation, under which the
suppression of dissidents exercising their right to free speech may be
warranted by the need to defend the more important interests of the
state. 7 The notion of collectivist rights is manifest in the language of the
1982 Constitution itself, which refers to human rights as "citizen's rights
and freedoms" and subjects them to certain restrictions in the interests of
promoting national welfare.188 As with many developing nations, China
has also consistently prioritized social and economic rights over civil and
political liberties, based on the belief that entitlement to subsistence and
development is a prerequisite to the enjoyment of other rights and
therefore essential for people living in less developed regions.' 89 In its
rejection of the notion of individual rights as superior to the interests of the
state, the PRC has thus remained somewhat of a conscientious objector to

185. See Peerenboom, supranote 8, at 494-96 (comparing various alternative conceptions of
human rights). Against the backdrop of the Iraqi prisoner abuse scandal in early 2004, China has
recently condemned the U.S. report on human rights abuses around the world as hypocrisy. See US.
Human Rights Hypocrisy Attacked, PEOPLE'S DAILY, May 22, 2004, available at http://english.
peopledaily.com.cn/other/archive.html.
186. Although the Chinese government tends to justify its rejection of the universal human
rights model as a consequence of traditional Chinese values, Davis traces its official rights
orientation back to the structural imperatives of its authoritarian regimes since the 1930s. See
Davis, supra note 15, at 146.
187. Id. at 145. Once characterized as counterrevolutionary, dissenting voices on fundamental
issues of freedom and democracy are now suppressed in the interests of "national security." See
XIANFAart. 28 (1982) (amended 1999) (revising "[t]he State maintains public order and suppresses
treasonable and other counter-revolutionary activities" to "[t]he State maintains public order and
suppresses treasonable and other criminal activities that endanger State security."); see also Whose
Security? State Security in China'sNew CriminalCode, HUMAN RIGHTS IN CHINA/HUMAN RIGHTS
WATCH/ASIA REPORT, Apr. 1997, at IV, availableat http://www.hrw.org/reports/1997/china5.
188. Constitutional restrictions clauses can be found in both the 1982 PRC Constitution and
the 1946 ROC Constitution. See, e.g., XIAN FA art. 51 (1982) ("[t]he exercise by citizens of the
People's Republic of China of their freedoms and rights may not infringe upon the interests of the
state, of society and of the collective, or upon the lawful freedoms and rights of other citizens").
See Davis, supra note 15, at 146.
189. See Human Rights to be Protectedby Constitution, supra note 15 (pointing out that
"different nations will focus on different aspects of human rights in their different development
phases").
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the European human rights tradition.' 90 Without the requisite degree of
rights-consciousness in China, it is easy to see how the very idea of human
rights has come to be regarded by many Chinese as a heavy-handed and
moralistic slogan allowing no room for differences in history, traditions
and culture. 19'

Notably, the CPC has since reconsidered the issue and is now in the
practice of issuing periodic reports on human rights developments both in
China and around the world.'92 As the name suggests, however, "citizen's
rights" in China derives from statutory rather than natural law and
therefore may not infringe upon the legislative power of the PRC
government. 93 Furthermore, since the scope of citizen's rights is not
specified in the Constitution, 94 the meaning of any constitutional
provision calling for its protection will necessarily depend on subsequent
legislation.' While it may therefore have no direct effect on ongoing
human rights abuses in China, the Article 33 amendment is important
precisely because it represents the first instance in which explicit reference
is made to the protection of human rights as opposed to citizen's rights.
This suggests that the CPC has finally acknowledged the Western notion
of universal rights as existing beyond the scope of domestic legislation.'96
The legal basis for this extended protection is not clearly indicated, though
it can be inferred that the applicable standards should include existing
constitutional provisions as well as various international human rights
instruments to which China is a party. 97

190. See Peerenboom, supranote 8, at 494.
191. See Lubman, supranote 10, at 413-14 (arguing that China's human rights record will not
improve in response to foreign pressure unless accompanied by a more widespread awareness of
the Western concept of legal rights).
192. A White Paper entitled "Human Rights in China" and issued on November 1, 1991 was
the first official document confirming the status of human rights in China, though the promotion
of human rights as a major focus of development under the leadership of the party did not come
about until the first major congressional report on the subject was presented to the Fifteenth NPC
in September 1997. See Inclusion of Human Rights, supranote 4.
193. See Morikawa, supra note 31 (contrasting the notion of "citizen's rights" in China with
the Western idea of "human rights").
194. Article 33 of the PRC Constitution merely states that "[e]very citizen enjoys the rights
and at the same time must perform the duties prescribed by the Constitution and the law." XIAN FA
art. 33(4) (1982) (amended 2004).
195. See Morikawa, supra note 31.
196. See Ji Weidong, From EmphasizingPrivatePropertyRights to ImprovingGovernance:
Interpreting the Draft ofthe Fourth Amendment to the Constitution, CALLING MAG., May 1, 2004,
availableathttp://www.caijing.com.cn/english/2004/0105/0105jiweidong.htm (last visited July 28,
2004); see also Li Wuzhou, supranote 2.
197. Li Wuzhou, supra note 2; see also supra text accompanying note 184.
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Fifteen years after former Chinese premier Li Peng invoked martial law
to put down the unarmed pro-democracy protesters in Tiananmen Square,
a related amendment has now struck all references to martial law from the
1 98
PRC Constitution and replaced them with the term "state ofemergency."
At the time, many considered Li's crackdown unconstitutional on account
of his failure to seek NPC approval beforehand. 99 The NPC recognized as
much the following year when it decided to pass legislation laying out
specific conditions under which martial law could be declared.2 °° In this
context, the most immediate effect of the 2004 amendment would be to
render the 1990 Law on Martial Law moot while laying a constitutional
foundation for China's first Emergency Law.20 ' Indicative of China
transition towards rule of law in general, the amendment was also in large
part a response to the government's mishandling of the Severe Acute
Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) epidemic in spring 2003.202
According to mainland legal experts, the revision is more than
semantic. While martial law is enforced where severe turbulence or social
turmoil threatens the nation's stability or the safety of life and property,
the domain of an emergency law is presumably broader in that it can apply
to war, natural disasters, public sanitation, and economic crises as well as
social turbulence. 20 3 The enforcement of martial law typically conjures up
brutal images of military crackdowns and gross violations of human rights;
the enforcement of emergency law involves administrative measures under
which the scope of temporary restrictions on citizens' freedom is defined
in accordance with explicit regulations.2 °4 Some have also suggested that
the amendment may be an attempt to rectify the growing incongruity
between martial law and the socialist market economy, under which the

198. See XIAN FA arts. 67(20), 80, 89(16) (1982) (amended 2004) (authorizing the President
ofthe PRC to declare a "state of emergency" pursuant to NPCSC approval); see also China to Drop
"Martial Law" 15 Years After Tiananmen Crackdown, CHANNELNEWSASIA.COM, Jan. 7, 2004
[hereinafter China to Drop Martial Law], available at http://www.channelnewsasia.com/stories/
afp_asiapacific/view/65245/l/.html (last visited June 2, 2005).
199. See China to Drop Martial Law, supra note 198.
200. See id.
201. See id.; Constitutional Amendment Paves Wayfor Emergency Law, CHINA DAILY, July
1, 2004 [hereinafter Constitutional Amendment Paves Way] ("[a]lthough China now has a
...
National Defense Law and Flood Control Law, as well as an Earthquake Control and Disaster
Relief Law, . . . the country still lacks a comprehensive Emergency Law"), available at
http://www2.chinadaily.com.cn/en/doc/2004-0 1/07/content_296344. htm.
202. See China to Drop Martial Law, supra note 198.
203. See Constitutional Amendment Paves Way, supra note 201.
204. Id; see also A Look Through Expert Eyes, supra note 1.
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government should no longer be allowed to arbitrarily allocate social and
natural resources in times of emergency.20 5
As is the case with most constitutional revisions in China, the human
rights and "state of emergency" amendments represent yet another attempt
by the Communist Party to adapt to historical conditions while reinforcing
its own legitimacy in the eyes of the populace and the world.20 6 Judging by
the dubious reaction of most Western commentators, however, it is going
to require a good deal more than "fine words" for China to gain any
international recognition and praise for its efforts. 20 7 The CPC must first
stop arresting Chinese Catholics like Wei Jingyi for leading
nongovernment-sanctioned church services in people's homes, torturing
Falun Gong practitioners like James Ouyang for practicing their spiritual
beliefs, and detaining outspoken advocates like Du Daobin for questioning
government policy on the Internet. 2°" As one Human Rights Watch
researcher has pointed out, although the PRC Constitution amply respects
and safeguards human rights, those in power have shown little inclination
to respect and safeguard the PRC Constitution.20 9
IV.CONCLUSION: ENFORCING "PAPER LIBERTY"

In a December 4, 2002 speech celebrating its twentieth anniversary,
then Vice-President Hu Jintao extolled the 1982 Constitution as providing
the "general charter for governing the country," the "legal basis for
maintaining national unity, ethnic solidarity [and] economic
development," and the "legal guarantee for the CPC in exercising power
and rejuvenating the country., 210 The text of the 1982 PRC Constitution
contains a veritable laundry list of rights, their numbers growing with each
year; yet without any democratic check on government, Chinese people do
205. See ConstitutionalAmendment Paves Way, supra note 201.
206. See, e.g., LilunDongtai:Jiekai Wo Guo Renquan BaozhangXinPianzhang[Theoretical
Trends: Uncovering a New Chapterin China'sProtectionofHuman Rights], CHINA ECON. TIMES
(China), Mar. 16, 2004 ("The recent round of amendments ... once again demonstrates the
Chinese government's ability to adapt to historical trends... and should win high praise from the
international community"), availableat http://www.cet.com.cn.
207. See Amnesty International Press Release, supra note 13 (responding to the 2004
amendment on human rights by proclaiming that "fine words are not enough" and that
constitutional revisions "must be backed by concrete action").
208. See ConcreteAction, supranote 12; John Pomfret & Philip P. Pan, Torture is Breaking
Falun Gong, China Systematically EradicatingGroup, WASH. POST, Aug. 5, 2001; see Davis,
supranote 101.
209. Davis, supra note 101.
210. See Hu Jintao, supra note 7.
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not have the opportunity to enjoy them.21 ' This is a common sentiment
among those who dismiss the idea of a growing constitutionalism in China
despite strong evidence to the contrary.
Those who deny the Chinese legal system the label rule of law and
therefore reject the possibility of any form of constitutionalism in the PRC,
are invariably referring to its liberal democratic manifestation.212 Skeptics
assert that rule of law, and therefore true constitutionalism, requires
meaningful judicial protection of fundamental human rights, the dispersion
of political power and authority, and free and open elections for national
office, all of which they say are nonexistent in China.213 Critics also tend
to point out the fact that the right to speak out on fundamental issues of
freedom and democracy, considered essential for maintaining productive
dialogue within the marketplace of ideas, is suppressed in China as
counterrevolutionary
or more recently, against the interests of national
214
security.
Part of the problem is that although the CPC and its individual
members are ostensibly obligated to follow the law under the 1999
amendments to Article 5 of the PRC Constitution, the role of the party
itself remains undefined in law. 2 5 Given the scope of the CPC's
intervention in both the legislative and judicial branches of government,
this is a serious failing. Under China's system of legislative supremacy,
the NPC, by the very act of passing laws, certifies their constitutionality
thereby rendering all legislation immune to judicial review.216 Unlike most
Western countries, judicial interpretation in China is limited to problems
arising during the application of the law, with the power to declare the
unconstitutionality of a given law vested exclusively in the NPCSC. 217 Yet,
211. See, e.g., Ramirez, supra note 12 (arguing that without the implementation of practical
measures to implement both the 2004 constitutional amendment and the international human rights
instruments ratified by the PRC, China's official acceptance of human rights standards is
meaningless).
212. See Peerenboom, supra note 8, at 473.
213. See Dowdle, supranote 18, at 6-7.
214. See XIAN FA art. 28 (1982) (amended 1999); see also supra text accompanying note 187.
The "marketplace of ideas" metaphor, intended to encapsulate a conception of freedom of speech
in which truth inevitably prevails from the open competition of ideas, was coined in 1919 in a
dissenting opinion by Justice Holmes. Charles Levendosky, Marketplace Keeps Speech Free of
Government Controls,CASPER-STARTRIB., July 17, 1997, availableathttp://fact.trib.com/1 st.lev.
internet.marketplace.html.
215. See Peerenboom, supra note 8, at 516.
216. See Davis, supra note 15, at 145.
217. See Li Yahong, supranote 44, at 134-36, 138; see also Law-Making Law art. 42 (2000).
In the history of the PRC, there have only been three occasions in which the NPCSC has exercised
its power of interpreting laws, the most recent of which involved its interpretation of the HKSAR
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NPC and NPCSC delegates are not elected directly and must operate
within the bounds of the CPC's limited political tolerance.2" 8 Since the
party makes all final decisions, what has been dubbed the rubber-stamp
parliament of the NPC and its Standing Committee is dismissed as nothing
more than a legitimizing facade for the communist dictatorship.2" 9
Although the CPC does not typically interfere in specific cases, courts in
China are still subject to the supervision of the NPC and the legal
profession as a whole is governed by the Ministry of Justice.22 ° Whether
politically sensitive cases are handled according to law is generally a
useful indicator of whether a legal system meets the requirements of rule
of law, since such a system would most likely handle other less
controversial cases in a similar way. In China, however, political
dissidents are regularly denied a procedurally fair trial while senior
government officials are rarely held accountable without the implicit
support of the party.22'
To be sure, China's legal system suffers from a number of deficiencies,
many of them institutional in nature. As recent developments have shown,
however, there are real indications that the PRC is cultivating a genuine,
albeit flawed, brand of constitutionalism.222 The growth of the NPC into
a potent constitutional force capable of influencing the activities of more
politically endowed actors clearly reflects this development. While the
NPC rarely votes down a formal submission, public officials take the
threat of delegate dissent seriously to the point where the NPC has
developed a sort of pocket veto over draft bills submitted to it.223 The

Basic Law during the "right of abode" controversy. Its power of constitutional interpretation,
however, has never been expressly exercised. See Chen, supranote 11, at 413.
218. See Dowdle, supra note 18, at 6.
219. See Cheng, supra note 66; see also JEAN-PIERRE CABESTAN, THE RELATIONSHIP
BETWEEN THE NATIONAL PEOPLE'S CONGRESS AND THE STATE COUNCIL IN THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC

OF CHINA: A FEW CHECKS BUT No BALANCES (CEFC, Working Paper No. 1, July 2000). Such

skepticism is based on a conception of the NPC as merely another loci of power where CPC
factions argue and reach compromise on certain issues outside the authority of the executive or
judiciary, rather than as an independent institution designed to balance the powers of the State
Council and the CPC. See id.
220. See Peerenboom, supra note 8, at 502-03.
221. As Peerenboom points out, however, senior officials in the United States are rarely held
accountable for their actions while procedural fairness does not necessarily prevent political
dissidents from going to jail under repressive U.S. laws criminalizing "subversive advocacy." See
id. at 514, 518.
222. See generally Dowdle, supra note 18.
223. Low approval rates for both the 1994 National Education Law as well as the CPC's
nominees for public office, for instance, have compelled the State Council to devote more of the
national budget to education and the CPC to revise its nomination procedures. See id. at 2-3.
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recent series of parliamentary investigations into matters of social and
economic importance overlooked by the State Council constitutes further
evidence of the NPC's pivotal role in China's emerging system of political
accountability.224
Finally, with the proliferation of new laws in the PRC, Chinese
legislators have begun to realize the importance of establishing some kind
of supervisory organ to ascertain the constitutionality of a given law when
a conflict between laws occurs. As early as 1994, the establishment of a
PRC Constitution Committee was proposed, in which the power of
legislative review would be transferred from the exclusive control of the
NPCSC to a quasi-constitutional court composed of independent and
neutral legal scholars.225 The proposition was subsequently abandoned in
favor of dispersing the supervisory power among various "relevant special
committees" of the NPCSC, though the NPC more recently announced the
establishment of a legislative review panel (fagui shencha bei an shi)
under its Legal Affairs Committee to investigate conflicts between the
PRC Constitution, as amended, and existing laws and regulations.226
Though the PRC Constitution itself remains non-justiciable, the
introduction of such radical changes is a sure sign of the growing
importance of constitutional implementation and enforcement in China.227
What impact have the amendments themselves had on the changing
constitutional dynamics of the PRC? Absent the right to sue for violations
of human rights or private property, the amendments are of little practical
value for individual members of society.228 Their impact may be further
restricted by the extent to which they merely serve to legitimize existing
rights and interests instead of creating new ones.229 Still, it may be helpful
224. NPC investigations into the State Council's neglect of rising unemployment, inadequate
educational funding, and growing crime rates in China have instigated greater attention to social
security, gradual increases in education funding, as well as the recent "strike hard" anticrime
campaign. See id. at 4.
225. Some saw the proposal as "one of the most revolutionary and far-reaching reforms ever
introduced into the PRC legal system." See Li Yahong, supra note 45, at 133-34.
226. See id.
at 134-36; see also Xiao Yang, Legislative Review Panelto Smooth LegalBumps,
CHINA DAILY, June 21, 2004, at 6; Yue Jianguo, Zhi De QidaiDe "Yi Xiao Bu " [A "Small Step"
Worth Waiting For], CHINA ECON. TIMES, June 22, 2004.

227. See Yue Jianguo, supranote 226 ("[a]lthough the legislative review panel does not have
the power to feasibly eliminate laws and regulations which violate the Constitution, the fact that
it has been established is at least a step in the right direction"). Even while emphasizing the
importance of adhering to party leadership when interpreting the PRC Constitution, Hu Jintao
himself has talked of developing the PRC Constitution into a "legal weapon for ensuring civil
rights." See Hu Jintao, supra note 7.
228. See supra notes 17-19 and accompanying text.
229. See supra text accompanying notes 88-92.
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to see constitutional revisionism in China as part of an ongoing process of
institutional development in which the introduction of each new
amendment puts pressure on the state to draft more comprehensive
legislation in a given area.23 ° According to Donald Clarke, the amendments
offer social advocates and private enterprises a powerful rhetorical weapon
in their struggle with government policy for further reforms and
protection, while the NPC offers a convenient forum for the expression of
those interests that have been emboldened by the amendments."' Of
course, the legitimacy of such a theory necessarily depends on the political
activism of the various interest groups and, perhaps more importantly, the
central government's willingness to respond to these varying interests.
Given the growing importance of rule of law for the legitimacy of the CPC
as well as China's increasing rights awareness, one thing is certain:
Chinese constitutionalism, as it exists today, represents much more than
mere "paper liberty."

230. See Subrahmanyan, supra note 7.
231. Clarke likes to characterize the constitutional amendments as declarations of upcoming
legislative agendas. See id.
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